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) Kootenai Co. Case No. 
) CR-2010-14353 
) 
) RESPONDENT'S REPLY SRI 
) ON REVIEVV 
-------------------------- ) 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
COpy 
This Court Should Reject Elias's Argument That Giving Meaning To The Term "Force" 
In Idaho Code § 18-6608 Requires Engrafting The Consent Element From Forcible 
Rape, I.C. § 18-6101 (4). Onto The Penetration Element Of Forcible Sexual Penetration 
By Use Of A Foreign Object, I.C. § 18-6608 
Elias challenges his conviction for forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign 
object, arguing that, in order to give meaning to the term "force" in the forcible sexual 
penetration statute, this Court must engraft the extrinsic force requirement from the 
consent element of forcible rape onto the force requirement from the penetration 
element of forcible sexual penetration. (Response on 
argument 
1 
The actus reus of rape requires two major elements: First, the penetration, 
however siight, of a vagina by a penis; second, non-consent, whether legal or factual. 
The statute specifically provides that the state may show that the penetration was 
legally nonconsensual by showing that the female victim is underage (I.C. § 18-6101 (1 
and 2)); by showing that the she is incapable of giving legal consent through 
unsoundness of mind (I.C. § 18-6101 (3)); or by showing that she was unable to resist 
due to intoxication (I.C. § 18-6101 (5)). The state may show that the penetration was 
factually nonconsensual by showing that the victim resisted but her resistance was 
overcome by force or violence (I.C. § 18-6101 (4)); by showing that she was 
unconscious of the act, either because she was asleep or because she was not 
cognizant of the act (I. C. § 18-6101 (6)); by showing that she submitted under mistaken 
beliefs (I.C. § 18-6101 (7 and 8)); or by showing that she was placed under duress (I.C. 
§ 18-6101(9)). 
Only forcible rape, I.C. § 18-6101 (4), where perpetrator uses his penis to 
cause the penetration, however slight, of the victim's vagina, and also uses force or 
violence to overcome her resistance, requires application of the extrinsic force standard. 
State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412,422,299 P.3d 219, 229 (2013). The reason it requires 
the extrinsic force standard is because the "force sufficient to overcome the victim's 
resistance" goes to a different element than the mere penetration of the victim's vagina 
by the perpetrator's penis; it goes to the element of non-consent. See at 1, 299 
P.3d at 228 (citing State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 534 (1989)). 
Similar to rape, the actus reus of forcible sexual by use of a 
object requires two main elements: First, the a or 
2 
anus by anything but a penis; second, non-consent, whether legal or factual. The state 
may show that the penetration was legally nonconsensual either because the victim was 
intoxicated or because the victim was incapable of giving consent due to unsoundness 
of mind. The state is not limited, however, in how it may show that the penetration was 
factually nonconsensuaL The state must only show that the penetration was in fact 
"against the victim's will" and, where factually nonconsensual, caused "by use of force 
or violence or by duress, or by threats of immediate and great bodily harm, 
accompanied by apparent power of execution." I.e. § 18-6608. 
Unlike in the narrow crime of forcible rape, there is no requirement in the forcible 
sexual penetration statute that the victim resist and that her resistance be overcome by 
force or violence. The extrinsic force standard articulated in Jones, which goes to 
proving the element of non-consent by overcoming resistance, is entirely inapplicable 
forcible sexual penetration. Elias seeks to engraft the non-consent element from 
forcible rape the penetration element of forcible sexual penetration, but that is a 
complete non sequitur. This Court should reject Elias's invitation to engraft the consent 
element from forcible rape onto the penetration element of forcible sexual penetration. 
Under the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-6608, the state is not required to 
demonstrate 
for forcible 
the penetration was caused by "extrinsic force" to sustain a conviction 
penetration because the state need not prove that the victim 
and her resistance was overcome. Rather, the state must only show that the 
penetration was caused "by use of force." 
use of force in forcible sexual penetration goes to penetration rather 
than resistance, use of the "force" in Idaho Code § 18-6608 is 
3 
analogous to how the same word is used in the battery statute, I.C. § 18-903(1) 
(defining battery as the "[w]illful and unlawful use of or violence upon the person of 
another"). Jurors experience no apparent difficulty in applying the common 
understanding of the term "force" when determining whether a battery has been 
committed. Force, within the normal meaning of the word, is more than mere touching, 
but less than violence. Applying the complicated legalistic definition of "extrinsic force" 
to a term which is well within the common understanding of the average juror is not only 
unnecessary and unhelpful, it defies the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-6608. This 
Court should decline Elias's invitation to confuse the issue of "force" and instead 
continue to apply the common understanding of that term. 
Under the forcible sexual penetration statute, any nonconsensual penetration, 
however slight, of the vagina or anus of a victim that is caused by something more than 
mere touching is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of forcible sexual 
penetration with a foreign object. acknowledges the evidence establishes that 
he penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina with finger. (Response on review, p.1.) There was 
sufficient evidence presented at trial by which the jury could reasonably infer that S.L.S. 
did not consent to the penetration, such as S.L.S. being asleep when Elias penetrated 
her vagina and Elias having to break 
to S.L.S. , pAD, Ls.1 . p.51, 
her home at 3:00 a.m. in order to gain access 
-p.52, L.10; p.74, Ls.2-10.) Likewise, there 
was sufficient evidence by which the jury could reasonably infer that Elias accomplished 
the penetration by use of force-something more than mere touching-because the 
caused S.L.S. pain and (Tr., pA1, LS.1 p.101, 18-23.) 
4 
In his response on review, Elias asserts that this argument seeks to prove the 
cause (sexual penetration by use of force) from the effect (pain and injury). (Response 
on review, pp.22-24.) Of course it does, because that is what an inference is. Elias's 
argument misunderstands the sufficiency of the evidence standard. Under the 
sufficiency standard, it is well settled that juries "may draw all reasonable inferences 
from the evidence presented." State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 
792 (2008) (citations omitted). Indeed, drawing those reasonable inferences is the 
exclusive province of the jury, for "[o]n appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court 
is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003) 
(citations omitted; emphasis added). Where the effect of the sexual penetration is 
painful and injurious, a jury may properly infer that the cause of the sexual penetration 
was at least "force"-something more than mere touching. 
The state has never argued that pain and injury are direct evidence, in and of 
themselves, which conclusively prove that a sexual penetration was accomplished by 
force or violence. Rather, the state has consistently argued that pain and injury' are 
evidence by which a can reasonably that the sexual penetration was 
accomplished by force or violence. Respondent's brief, p.8; Brief in support of 
review, pp.5, 10.) Under the facts this case, because Elias's penetration caused 
S.L.S. pain and injury, there was sufficient evidence by which the jury could infer that 
penetration was caused by force. To suggest, as Elias does in on 
5 
review, that pain and injury are not evidence whereby a jury could reasonably infer that 
a sexual penetration was caused by force-something more than mere touching-is to 
deny that force can cause pain and injury.1 
When Elias broke into S.LS.'s house in the middle of the night, snuck up the 
stairs to her bedroom where she lay sleeping between her two children, and inserted his 
finger into her vagina causing her pain and injury, he committed the crime of forcible 
sexual penetration by use of a foreign object The jury's conviction of Elias for this 
crime is supported by sufficient, competent evidence. Elias's conviction should 
therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Elias's conviction and 
sentence for 
DATED this 1 
sexual penetration. 
day January, 2013. 
RUSSELLJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
1 Elias also argues that pain and injury are not evidence by which a jury can find force 
because they can occur during consensual sexual penetration. (Response on review, 
pp.23-24.) This argument is irrelevant. Consensual sexual penetration of a vagina or 
anus is not a crime in the State regardless of how forceful or it may be. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTI that I have this 10th day of January, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENY'S REPLY BRIEF ON REVIEW by 
causing a copy addressed to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RJS/pm 
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'--ROSSELL J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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